Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Bloc by Osipian, Ararat
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in
the Former Soviet Bloc
Ararat Osipian
Vanderbilt University
1. May 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7591/
MPRA Paper No. 7591, posted 10. March 2008 00:44 UTC
 1
Vanderbilt University 
 
Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Bloc 
 
 
 
Ararat L. Osipian 
 
 
Dept. of Leadership, Policy, and Organizations 
Peabody College of Education 
Vanderbilt University 
Peabody #514 
230 Appleton Place 
Nashville, TN 37203-5721 
 
Ph: (615)322-8000 
Fax: (615)3432391 
 
ararat.osipian@vanderbilt.edu 
 
araratos@yahoo.com 
 
Correspondence: 
3105 Bellwood st., apt. H 
Nashville, TN, 37203, USA 
 
Nashville, TN - 2007 
 2
Increasing scale and scope of corruption in the former Soviet Bloc, as well as numerous 
other countries, urges better understanding of the problem within the context of socio-economic 
transformations as it touches upon issues of organizational structures. This paper presents an 
overview of the research on corruption in organizations and develops models of corrupt 
organizations, including the vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the hierarchy, as 
applied to transition economies. 
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Introduction 
Increasing scale and scope of corruption in the former Soviet Bloc, as well as numerous 
other countries, urges better understanding of the problem within the context of socio-economic 
transformations. The increasing gap between pay rates in private and public sectors of the 
economy urges public employees to seek other sources of income (Gorodnichenko and 
Sabirianova, 2006). Rapid development of market reforms, privatization and increasing flow of 
financial resources have expanded a base for corruption. Public servants adjust their professional 
ethics and behavior accordingly by accepting bribes and numerous other benefits and utilizing 
their privileged position and control over the access to public services. 
In 1999 James Leach, Chairman of the US House Banking Committee, wrote that he had 
conducted a study of the most corrupt regimes, including the Philippines under Marcos, Zaire 
under Mabutu, and Indonesia under Suharto. Bad as these were, each was outdone by the 
“pervasiveness of politically tolerated corruption’ in post-communist Russia (New York Times, 
September 10, 1999; Shleifer and Treisman, 2003, p. 27). Studies show that perceptions of the 
public about corruption lead to an increase in the number of incidences of corruption and total 
volume of graft (Cabelkova and Hanousek, 2004; Tumennasan, 2005, Olken, 2006). Contrary to 
expectations, development of a substantial private sector in Russia, China, and other countries 
leads to an increase in corruption. Private institutions may be as corrupt as their public 
counterparts, which proves that not only public officials are susceptible to corruption. 
This paper presents an overview of the research on corruption and develops models of 
corrupt organizations, including vertical structure, horizontal structure, and hierarchy. The 
former Soviet Union is taken to study evolution of organizational forms of corruption because 
 4
the region is characterized by a high level of corruption and a process of rapid socio-economic 
developments and major changes in which new organizational structures are shaped. 
Corruption and hierarchies 
A poll developed by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research showed that 78 percent 
of respondents believed that all or most of the government officials have accepted bribes. More 
than 80 percent stated that corruption was prevalent within the judicial branch of government, 
while 71 percent responded in the affirmative to a query about whether they believed that most 
government officials were tied to the mafia or private family business relations. Moreover, good 
portion of Ukrainians is inclined to accept bribery as a normal part of everyday life 
(Woronowycz, 2003). Solomon and Foglesong (2001, p. 75) note that the number of reported 
incidents in Ukraine rose two-and-a-half-fold between 1990 and 1998 to 2,449, and these 
incidents led to 1,641 convictions. Numerous surveys in the Russian Federation reveal the same 
situation with corruption. The total estimate of the amount entrepreneurs have paid to officials in 
2001 approximated $33.5 billion, slightly less than the total revenue of the Federal budget in this 
year (Popov, 2005, p. 33). This does not include bribes that consumers pay for access to 
healthcare services, social services, and educational services as well as ordinary bribes to traffic 
police etc. paid on a daily basis. More than half of all Russians had to pay a bribe at least once in 
their lives, while 19 percent do it quite often. Most often bribes are paid for medical services (51 
percent of the respondents), followed by traffic violations (31 percent of the respondents) and 
educational services (20 percent of the respondents) (Popov, 2005). 
Corruption increases inequalities in access to public services, slows down the process of 
market reforms and accumulation of human capital, and hence impedes economic growth and 
negatively affects economic development and social progress. A substantial body of literature is 
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now being developed on corruption as a phenomenon of transition economies, starting from the 
Soviet times and up to the present. 
While presence of corruption in organizations is widely acknowledged, the phenomenon 
needs a comprehensive theoretical description. Transparency International uses a clear and 
focused definition of corruption operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Corruption is further separated on “according to rule” corruption and “against the 
rule” corruption. “Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment 
for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on 
the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.” 
(Transparency International, 2007) 
Corruption may be defined as a system of informal relations established to regulate 
unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through abuse of the office of public or 
corporate trust. Corruption may develop vertically across the levels in an organizational 
hierarchy. Carillo (2000) notes: “But corruption can propagate within the hierarchy. We capture 
this recursive property of corruption by assuming that agents can share the bribe with their 
superiors in exchange for not being denounced.” (p. 3) Development of corruption through a 
hierarchy of levels of authority and subordination presupposes existence of collusion between 
supervisors and agents within organizations’ hierarchies. 
Collusion may develop between agents and their supervisors on different levels of 
bureaucratic hierarchies. Collusion for corruption can take place in both public and private 
bureaucracies. Weber writes about bureaucratic hierarchies: “The principles of office hierarchy 
and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in 
which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the 
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governed the possibility of appealing the decision of a lower office to its higher authority, in a 
definitely regulated manner. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the office 
hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in 
all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as well as in large party 
organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether 
its authority is called ‘private’ or ‘public’.” (Weber, p. 650) In case of corrupt collusion not only 
agents betray their principals or supervisors, but supervisors do it as well. 
Combining vertical and horizontal structures of corruption 
The form of organization that existed under the planned economy in the USSR can be 
characterized as a vertical structure. The level of tolerance of corruption by co-workers as well as 
by the public in general was quite low. Corruption was considered unordinary or extraordinary 
and definitely wrong. The level of transparency was high in relation to the investigated and 
prosecuted cases of corruption. For instance, Saleh (2003) points out that in 1986 the central 
government fared 13 thousand bureaucrats and economic directors and reprimanded another 100 
thousand for corrupt activities, including embezzlement, fraud, and bribery. 
Major characteristics of the vertical structure include absolute degree of centralization 
and concentration of formal authority, when all major decisions are made at the top level. Top-
level bureaucrats concentrate most of the discretionary power. Bribe-takers or corruptioners have 
an opportunity to draw some benefits from their position without using their subordinates. They 
operate in conditions of clear laws and regulations, as well as high risk of punishment. The 
vertical structure anticipates a very high degree of monopolization and discretionary power that 
could be found in large bureaucracies of the USSR. Corruptioners, positioned at the top of their 
organizations and institutions, enjoy near-perfect monopoly in access to benefits of corruption. 
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The level of secrecy in vertical structures is very high while the presence of corruption is 
not widely acknowledged. The high level of secrecy may be explained by two facts: first, 
corruptioners do not need broad networks of corrupt interrelations with their subordinates and so 
corruption is localized and confined to a small group of individuals; second, the risk of actual 
punishment by the state machine is very high and the degree of punishment is high as well. 
In the soviet period the cases of corruption were addressed in the governmental 
publications. The publications themselves were authorized by the central authorities since all the 
media was controlled by the state and the Party organs (McNair, 1991). Such publications were 
based on particular legal cases, maintaining the ideology of honesty and moral purity. Ivanov 
suggests that the low level of corruption among bureaucrats was maintained by the ideology and 
ethical standards (Vzgliad, November 10, 2005). Examples of corruption presented in the Soviet 
media included the so-called Coal mafia and the Coal investigation in Donbass (Matsuzato, 
2001), and the Cotton mafia and Cotton investigation in Uzbekistan (Dodolev and Gdlian, 1991; 
Ivanov and Gdlian, 1994), as well as numerous cases of embezzlement, fraud, and speculations 
in the retail sector. The investigation of large-scale economic crimes in Central Asia in late 
1980s, conducted by two Moscow investigators Gdlian and Ivanov, received especially wide 
publicity. The investigators discovered a high level of pripiski (write-ins or fraudulent reports 
that indicate higher than actual output) in both agriculture and industry and numerous connected 
economic crimes. The results of the investigation pointed to existence of vertical corrupt 
structures in the region as well as elements of corruption hierarchy leading to the Central Party 
organs in Moscow. 
The major form of grand-scale corruption at that time was embezzlement. While in the 
retail sector there was plenty of petty corruption, in other industries corruption was relatively 
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rare. Embezzlement was not only of grand scale, but of small scale as well. The predominance of 
embezzlement over other forms of corruption is easy to explain. In Soviet times, dominated and 
indeed monopolized by the centralized systems of governance, management, control, and 
distribution, the major task for a corruptioner was embezzling from the state. Nesuny (carryout 
people), or the petty thieves who steal things from their workplaces, were objects of the state-
approved satire. Majority of workers would qualify as nesuny since just about everyone was 
taking home something from the workplace, including goods, prefabricated products, working 
tools, and even uniforms. It would be absurd to hear that a meat-packing-plant worker buys meat 
for his family in a grocery store or a school-supply worker buys pencils for her children to go to 
school. Employees of cold food storage facilities, refrigerated storage, and bazy (whole-sale 
storage facilities) were notorious for petty embezzlement while their managers enjoyed all the 
benefits of grand-scale embezzlement and blat. Petty embezzlement was mostly confined to 
personal consumption and the risks associated with nesuny were relatively insignificant. The 
dominating ideology of nesuny at that time was “Vseh ne posadish’,” i.e. it is impossible to 
imprison everyone. However, the sale of stolen goods was a crime and the risk of being punished 
was much higher. Soviet people were often surprised to learn from the press that workers in the 
West do not take anything from their workplaces. 
The major problem for a corruptioner was to actually enjoy the benefits derived from 
corruption. The state imposed restrictions on the level of personal consumption and exercised 
oversight over the lifestyles of the individuals. For instance, no one was allowed to own more 
than one car or build a two-storey private house. Access to housing was based on the number of 
family members and not the ability to pay. In the case of major expenditures, sources of income 
had to be justified by the household (Alexeev, 1988). Embezzlement of funds in monetary form 
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was rare while embezzlement of goods and materials was more common. A good example would 
be a director of kolhoz or sovhoz (a collective farm) who funded construction of a new school in 
his district while building a private house in a neighboring district. 
Forms of corruption were not limited to embezzlement and bribery. Nepotism and 
cronyism could be found in job placements, entering higher education institutions, or obtaining 
goods and services with limited or restricted access. Such practices were known as kumovstvo 
and blat. Blat can be defined as the access to a limited resource or asset based on informal 
connections. The Soviet economy, often characterized as the economy of deficit, where the 
access to goods and services was limited by production capacities, suffered of blat. In Birdsall’s 
view: “Blat was coupled with the Soviet system of property rights and distribution. Due to the 
nature of the Soviet order blat can be seen as parasitic on the Soviet economy, but at the same 
time as a natural reaction of ordinary people to the rigidities of the regime.” (Birdsall, 2000, p. 
170) With the development of market reforms deficit slowly disappeared, the excessive demand 
on consumer goods and services was met with the adequate supply, but the importance of blat or 
informal connections did not decline. Instead, it increased significantly. The transition from full 
and obligatory employment to a growing unemployment led to the dramatic increase in blat and 
kumovstvo in employment, since a job place became a limited resource. Many organizations and 
bureaucracies transformed into family enterprises with relatives working in one department. 
Kumovstvo, or a clan-based nepotism, was especially widespread in Transcaucasia and Central 
Asian Republics. Now nepotism and blat are commonplace in Russia and Ukraine as well. The 
growing clan-based nepotism becomes an actual replacement for a long-awaited civil society 
with a high level of social cohesion that has yet to develop. Widespread nepotism and blat 
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impede the development of labor market in the region and slow down the pace of economic 
reforms. 
Professional family-based clans that existed in Brezhnev era were strengthened and near-
institutionalized in 1990s. As Stepanenko (2006) remarks: “The family-clan strategies of survival 
in a post-communist society play a compensatory-simulative function similar to that of the 
‘people economy’ in the condition of the absence of a developed market economy. This is 
natural, given the fact that clientelism and corruption are social phenomena that have their roots 
and appearances above all in the socioeconomic sphere.” (p. 586). All of such practices require 
well-developed nets of informal relations and contacts among employees. 
In the USSR, the level of corruption varied region by region. While in the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics the level of everyday corruption was relatively low 
and corruption itself was confined to major cases of embezzlement and petty corruption in the 
retail sector, in the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia with its widespread blat and 
family-based clans, corruption was more common, including in the areas of education and 
healthcare (Le Nouvel Observateur, April 18, 2005). 
The period of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the USSR was characterized by 
Perestroika, the movement for independence in the republics and for market reforms. Parallel 
structures were introduced much earlier than the market reform has officially started. Arteli 
during the New Economic Policy (NEP), and later sovnarkhozy, tsekha in Brezhnev era, and 
kooperativy in Gorbachev era were all examples of parallel structures that formed so-called 
second economy, often referred to as semi-legal, grey market sector, and even unofficial or 
shadow economy. The creation of numerous new parallel structures in order to generate extra 
income was not caused by the decline in funding from the central budget, but by the relative 
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independence and openness and newly emerged opportunities of selling goods and services to 
match excessive demand on consumer products. Deficit of consumer goods and services lead to 
the accumulation of substantial savings by the population. Families were eager to buy goods 
produced by small collective enterprises called kooperativy (co-operators). Co-operative 
movement of 1986-1990, including the organization of small enterprises under the auspices of 
Komsomol (The Young Communist League), lead to an increase in corruption and in tax evasion. 
Here the vertical structure stays intact, incorporating the parallel structure. Later, tax evasion has 
developed into a major problem for the economy, while being well-tolerated by the society. 
Busse (2000) argues that “the apparent paradox of the overt condemnation and simultaneous 
covert pervasiveness of tax evasion is resolved in the Russian context by a selective and 
superficial criminalization of the problem.” (p. 129) 
In Kurkchiyan’s view, Perestroika was an ill-judged response to the success of the 
second economy, which was entirely a bottom-up process. She notes that “The second economy 
operated alongside (or indeed inside) the official economy, squeezing the available resources.” 
(Kurkchiyan, 2000, p. 88) According to the author, one could view the second economy as a 
stock of resources stolen from the state and improperly exploited. But, as Kurkchiyan points out, 
this view would be incomplete, because second economy was an important mechanism for 
redistribution in society, facilitating market transition. The parallel structures had a positive role 
in advancing economic reforms and creation of a market-based economy. 
Examples of parallel structures created in 1990s to ease the ways of embezzlement and 
create new venues for corruption are numerous. Private or so-called commercial banks were 
created within the large state enterprises. They paralleled state banks in issuing credits to the 
enterprises by which they were created. Playing on the difference in the interest rates, top 
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management of the state enterprises accumulated significant funds necessary for the future 
privatization of these enterprises (Blasi, 1996). The government encouraged establishment of 
autonomous units. Some of the newly created departments within large state-owned enterprises 
operated based on the principle of hozraschet, i.e. self-financing. 
Corruption that grew with the multiplying parallel structures was not something new to 
the country. The national economy already had rich experiences with corruption and abuse of 
state property during the period of 1921 to 1928, when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was set 
by the leadership of the young Soviet Republic. NEP was intended to introduce some market 
reforms and revitalize the economy, devastated by the World War I, Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, and the Civil War. Along with the positive results for the growing national economy NEP 
brought a growing culture of corruption and mismanagement (Fitzpatrick, Rabinowitch, and 
Stites, 1991; Kudriasvtsev, 1991; Goland, 1998). Small private enterprises and producers used 
the difference between prices set by the state and market prices to accumulate wealth. There 
were absurd cases when truckloads of goods were leaving a state enterprise through one gate and 
entering it back through the other gate. Some small enterprises turned into parasites on the body 
of large state enterprises. Large bureaucracies, created during the period of Military Communism 
to regulate allocation of scarce resources, were plagued by corruption. Bureaucrats of all ranks 
were colluding with newly emerged entrepreneurs or nepmany (NEPman) in order to maximize 
personal benefits obtained from corruption. Many corrupt schemes used in the transition 
economy of 1990s were but exact blueprints of corrupt schemes used during NEP. 
The key phrase that describes the period of transition from vertical to horizontal structure 
is “They want to eat and we do not,” as related to the higher-ups. This is a sarcastic phrase used 
by subordinates when referring to what motivates the actions of underpaid public servants, be it 
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bureaucrats or public sector employees, and their higher-ups. Centralized corruption, with its 
near-perfect level of monopolization of access to graft, no longer satisfies the majority of the 
employees, including state bureaucrats, police, health care professionals, educators, and utility 
services employees. Fitini (2000) points out that “socio-economic changes required that every 
member of Russian society abandon old understandings of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Russians had to 
accept that they had to play according to new legal rules which were often opposite to what they 
had been taught throughout the better part of their lives. What has been regarded as criminal in 
Soviet days (private entrepreneurship, dealing in hard currency, etc.) became a norm of life. The 
transition became a complex socio-psychological breakthrough, which violated the fundamental 
behavioural taboos of the old days.” (p. 22) 
One of the major characteristics of the horizontal structure is that it exists and develops 
through a process of decentralization and of declining concentration of formal authority. Other 
major characteristics include low salaries for employees and their opportunistic behavior. 
Conditions in which horizontal structures form and operate include the absence of clear laws and 
regulations, low risk of actual punishment, and prioritization of financial survival by 
organizations as well as by individuals. The emergence of the new class of entrepreneurs gives a 
strong impulse for “democratization” of corruption within the large state bureaucracy. 
Entrepreneurs seek access to state-owned resources, contracts, licenses, quotas, and permits, 
develop informal relations with bureaucrats, and bribe them. Businessmen compete for 
preferential treatment and protection that can be obtained from public officials. 
The degree of monopolization and discretionary power in the horizontal structures is low 
as compared to the vertical structure. Horizontal structures are less secretive. Even though 
corruptioners do not share the information, everyone knows that just about everyone accepts 
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bribes and gifts or enjoys other benefits of corruption. The existence of corrupt practices is 
widely acknowledged by the employees as well as by the general public. This situation is 
traditionally described as similar to sex in Victorian times, when “everyone does it but no one 
talks about it.” In education, healthcare, and bureaucracies, employees know of each other’s 
corrupt activities but do not discuss them. Such a situation, called krugovaya poruka, can be 
identified as a circle of salience, where corrupt bureaucrats protect their corrupt colleagues. 
The level of tolerance of informal payments in horizontal structures is high, as corruption 
is considered a part of everyday life. The level of transparency is high as well, with corruption 
being often highlighted in the mass media, including both official and independent sources. 
Publications are based on generalizations as well as particular legal cases and cover corruption in 
all the areas, including state bureaucracy, legislative branch, courts, business, health care, 
education, police, and other public services, while the comments on corruption come from such 
public officials as the President of the Russian Federation Mr. Putin and the Attorney General Mr. 
Ustinov (Newsru, December 24, 2001). The key phrases that characterize horizontal structures 
and that are uttered in a tone that is apologetic (in both senses of the term) are as follows: 
“Everyone wants to eat,” “We are all having hard times,” “Everyone takes [bribes],” “We are not 
the first in this, and not the last.” Birdsall (2000) defines such justification of corrupt activities 
and self-indulgence as “righteous indignation” (p. 158). Subordinates point to their corrupt 
supervisors with the notion that “if they do it, why should not I?” 
It would be incorrect to assume that corrupt practices are common mostly in Central Asia 
and to a lesser degree in Russia and Ukraine, while virtually non-existent in the Baltic States. 
The recent survey, conducted by the Ministry of Justice, found that 44 percent of people in 
Estonia are ready to bribe bureaucrats and public employees in order to avoid fines or obtain 
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permits, licenses, or services. 19 percent of people reported bribery in traffic police, 14 percent 
in accessing health services, and 13 percent pointed to corruption in schools. Entrepreneurs 
consider the central government as most corrupt, while 8 percent of businessmen paid bribes to 
local officials (Prokoshin, 2007). The Minister of Justice Mr. Lang points to growing corruption 
not only in public sector, but in private sector as well. 
In horizontal structures most of the benefits from corruption are generated by each 
corrupt bureaucrat individually and independently. The distribution of access to graft is based on 
such characteristics as rank and position. Rent-seeking behavior is commonplace. Corruption in 
many organizations becomes a norm, “just the way things are.” The moral dilemma of whether 
to involve in corrupt activities is replaced by the notion of adaptability and resolved thanks to the 
peer pressure of corrupt colleagues. According to Birdsall (2000), “The conviction that one’s 
behavior is no different from the norm is a powerful tool of reconciliation. Moral discomfort 
with earning practices is assuaged by the knowledge that one is merely conforming to a 
pervasive way of being.” (p. 157) 
Major forms of corruption present in horizontal structures are bribes as well as numerous 
latent forms of corruption, including nepotism, favoritism, exchange of favors, services, etc. All 
the forms are shaped by the process of adaptation to the new realities. The scale of corruption is 
presented by the full spectrum and varies from petty corruption to grand scale corruption, 
depending on the level of bureaucrat, his personal characteristics, etc. At the same time the 
widespread phenomenon of the Soviet times, nesuny, is by some estimates has declined (The 
Moscow Times, June 21, 1994). Privatization of state-owned enterprises led to tightening 
security and increasing worker responsibility. It is no longer easy to still from the workplace in 
many private-owned enterprises. 
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Transition from horizontal structure of corruption to hierarchy 
The transition from horizontal structure to hierarchy in different industries and different 
regions of the former USSR takes place in different periods. In some of the former Republics 
such a transition occurs starting in the early 1990s while in others it occurs in present times. The 
key phrase that captures what occurs during such a period is: “We do have corruption, but no one 
talks about it.” Hierarchies as forms of organization of corruption are by now typical not only for 
ruling regimes in Central Asia, but for monopolistic business structures in Russia and Ukraine as 
well. 
Hierarchy anticipates both formal and informal subordination. Its major characteristics 
are an absolute degree of centralization and a concentration of formal and informal authority. 
Conditions for a corrupt hierarchy include unclear laws and regulations as well as high risk of 
punishment for opposing illegal practices rather than for violating formal rules. The degree of 
monopolization and discretionary power in the hierarchy is high, with a near-perfect monopoly 
in access to benefits of corruption. Hierarchies are highly secretive, but the presence of 
corruption in such organizations is widely acknowledged by the outsiders and especially by the 
potential clientele. The high level of internal secrecy is explained in part by the presence of a 
developed net of corrupt relations through which corrupt practices are performed and the benefits 
of corruption channeled. The level of tolerance of corruption is high, with corruption accepted as 
a norm. Transparency is limited to the formally approved governmental publications 
(Zaynabitdinov, 2004; Ukaz, 2005; Zhertvennikov, 2004). 
Hierarchy is characterized by silence because of fear of being reprimanded or dismissed, 
but dismissals do take place. Public offices and managerial positions in state-owned enterprises 
are for sale, and competitors who offer higher bribes outbid each other in fight for a profitable 
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office. Bureaucrats and managers who already occupy offices are dismissed amid the accusations 
in corruption by the very same local leaders to whom they paid bribes in order to take the office. 
Their corrupt activities are used to allege them in wrongdoing. The whole system reminds of 
Stalin era chistki or cleanings, when former prosecutors often found themselves in the same labor 
camp with those who they unjustly sentenced earlier. Hemraev points out that corrupt hierarchy 
is especially notorious in the traffic patrol, where policemen on the roads collect bribes from 
drivers and then share the benefits with their supervisors all the way to the top of the hierarchical 
ladder (Hronika Turkmenistana, January 22, 2007). 
It would be difficult to single out just one form of corruption as the major form since 
many forms of corruption are present, including embezzlement, extortion, fraud, and bribery, as 
well as numerous latent forms of corruption, such as nepotism, favoritism, exchange of favors, 
exchange of services, etc. A corrupt hierarchy is characterized by the continuous invention and 
formalization of new forms and mechanisms of corruption in addition to those inherited from the 
horizontal structure. The preferred form of corruption may be bribes in cash, since part of the 
illegal benefits is supposed to be channeled to the higher-ups. All bribes, including services and 
favors, have a clearly defined monetary value. It is interesting that while public employees 
demand more bribes, people are less willing to offer bribes. For instance, results of two surveys, 
conducted in Russia in 2001 and 2005 and analyzed by the INDEM foundation, show a decline 
in the readiness to bribe among population from 74.7 percent to 53.2 percent (Satarov, 2006). 
The scale of corruption in the hierarchy is more significant than in the vertical structure 
and the horizontal structure. All levels of corruption are present, ranging from petty to grand 
corruption. The large scale of corruption is explained by the dominance of the process of 
maximization of the total amount of illegal benefits derived from corrupt activities based on 
 18
sharing and profiteering. The corrupt hierarchy is indivisible from collective corruption and 
collusion. Describing collective corruption Gong says that its purpose is “to maximize individual 
gains and/or minimize the risks associated with corrupt activities.” (Gong, 2002, p. 88) The 
hierarchy uses risk minimization as a tool for maximizing total benefits of corruption. 
Hierarchy is the highest organizational level of corruption when corruption is 
institutionalized or near-institutionalized and is a result of collective effort. This level is 
characterized by the delegation of corrupt functions to subordinates. Sharing and profiteering are 
the two dominating functions of the participants of corrupt activities and the corrupt structure 
overall. Subordinates collect bribes from the clientele and then channel benefits up the 
hierarchical ladder. At this stage the Top becomes a good “roof” or an “umbrella” for the entire 
corrupt structure, protecting it from a possible negative external impact. The roof or so-called 
krysha can be provided by top-level bureaucrats, police, secret services, and other law 
enforcement agencies, as well as criminal groups. In distinction from public officers, covered by 
their supervisors, entrepreneurs obtain guarantees of protection from state bureaucrats, police, 
and organized crime groups in exchange for bribes, sponsorship, and other favors. Petrov and 
Temple (2004, p. 87) point to routinization of corruption and to the fact that bribes are 
sometimes referred to as informal fees. The authors believe that at this point the rates are largely 
predetermined and that corruption acquires a semi-public character. 
There are numerous records and research statements that public offices in developing and 
transition economies are on sale and profitable or bread-winning places are bought-out (Gong, 
1997, 2002; Goorha, 2000; He, 2000). In the hierarchy, a lump sum payment is often required to 
receive a position in a corrupt organization. As Gong remarks in regard of China (though this is 
also true for the case of the former Soviet Republics), “today, buying and selling office has 
 19
become a rather common phenomenon.” (Gong, 2002, p. 100) The presence of such a practice 
also guarantees that the new employee accepts the informal rules of the hierarchy and will 
cooperate and share the benefits of corruption with the top. Accordingly, if a potential candidate 
refuses to make an advance lump sum payment, it means that he is likely not to conform to the 
rules of the hierarchy and hence he is denied access to the organization. The lump sum payment 
may also be made after the employment during which the money needed to make the payment 
can be earned and accumulated, as sufficient amount of money is accumulated to do the payment 
often referred to as establishing a “credit line.” This broadly accepted practice is similar to that 
used in human trafficking and other illegal businesses. 
Sometimes this type of career path starts from the time of one’s education. For instance, 
in order to enter a police academy one has to pay a lump sum bribe. He then makes his money 
back by accepting informal payments (Newsru, May 12, 2006; Newsru, February 21, 2007). 
Joining the traffic police after graduating from the police academy also costs money. By the time 
an individual joins the corrupt hierarchy he is already well-educated about the corrupt practices 
and ready to take part in them. In this case subordinates retain some of the benefits from 
corruption while giving the rest to those at the top. This process of sharing is administered 
through several links in the hierarchical chain till it reaches the top. The share can be either a 
fixed amount of money or a percentage. The hierarchy can also have a system of paybacks from 
the top to the immediate subordinates. In this case, the top collects all the benefits of corruption 
and then distributes part of them among the subordinates. 
Concluding remarks 
This paper identifies three major organizational structures of corruption, including the 
vertical structure, the horizontal structure, and the hierarchy as applied to the former Soviet Bloc. 
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The criteria selected include major characteristics, conditions or environment, degree of 
monopolization and distribution of discretionary power, levels of secrecy, tolerance, and 
transparency, predominant forms, and scale of corruption. Vertical structure is taken as an initial 
form of organizational structure with some presence of corruption that later transforms into 
horizontal structure. The horizontal structure may potentially transform into the hierarchy. 
Transitions from one structure to the other do not occur overnight but represent rather slow 
processes that vary from region to region. Characteristics of such processes are time and place 
specific. Simple forms of horizontal corrupt structures existed in some regions in Soviet times 
long before the start of the market reforms, coexisting with the dominant at that time vertical 
structure. For instance, in Central Asia horizontal structures of corruption were always secondary, 
first to the vertical structures and then to corrupt hierarchies. This predetermined smooth and 
almost immediate transition from the vertical structure to the hierarchy. 
Two major engines of perpetuating corruption in bureaucracies and public services are 
opportunism and financial survival of its employees. The strive for better material position and 
financial sustainability is realized through different organizational structures. These structures or 
nets of corrupt interrelations evolve and replace each other and lead to an increase in corruption. 
Changes in the characteristics of organizations, including increasing transparency and control, 
will not necessarily lead to the logically expected results. Fundamental changes might be needed 
to disintegrate organizational structures of corruption and reduce level of corruption in 
bureaucracies. Such fundamental changes in transition societies will include further advancement 
of market reforms, formation of the civil society, and strengthening of democratic institutions. 
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